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The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not
turn aside in their course, and pass the judges by.'
Considerate [people], of every description, ought to prize whatever
will tend to beget or fortify that temper in the courts; as no [person]
can be sure that he may not be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of
injustice, by which he may be a gainer today. And every [person]
must now feel that the inevitable tendency of such a spirit is to sap
the foundations of public and private confidence and to introduce in
its stead universal distrust and distress.2
Introduction
The impeachment process was instituted to remove "fallen" fed-
eral civil officers.3 Although the Constitution limits removal by im-
peachment to actions of "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors," 4 scholars have noted that impeachment proceedings
may be instituted for offenses outside the criminal realm.5 Such of-
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1. BENJAMIN CARDozo, NATuRE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
3. RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 1 (1973).
4. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 4. Additional constitutional provisions regarding impeach-
ment are: "The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment,"
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2; and U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6, which states:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for
that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be
convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.
5. See BERGER, supra note 3, at 58 (stating that criminality is not a requirement for
impeachment); see also CHARLES K. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TE AMERICAN CoNsrru-
aioN 87 (1922) (stating that grounds for impeachment may include misconduct in office);
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fenses include acts that undermine public confidence in the judiciary
or compromise the integrity of the judicial branch.6 Thus, one aim of
impeachment proceedings is to shield the judiciary from any appear-
ance of impropriety.
All federal judges take an oath to uphold the American legal sys-
tem.7 A judge who has abdicated the immense responsibility that the
position dictates must, by necessity, be disciplined. However, any
judge charged with wrongdoing must be entitled to the same benefits
of impartiality, justice, and fairness that have been the hallmarks of
our legal system. A truly successful legal system consistently operates
with fairness and impartiality toward all before it, and the American
legal system depends on public trust. When any aspect of such a jus-
tice system is fatally flawed in its treatment of one category of accused
persons, the rights of all accused are threatened and the public confi-
dence is diminished.
This Note argues that the current impeachment process, as ap-
plied to federal judges, violates the due process rights of accused
judges. 8 This Note also exposes the flaws in the current impeachment
ALEX SIMPSON, JR., A TREATISE ON FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTS (1973) (concluding that the
commission of a crime is not necessary to impeach); Arthur Bestor, Impeachment The
Constitutional Problems, 49 WASH. L. REv. 255 (1973) (book review) (noting that the
Framers of the Constitution intended impeachment to reach political conduct injurious to
the commonwealth, whether criminal or not). But see IRVING BRANT, IMPEACHMENT. TRI-
ALS & ERRORS 180-81 (1972) (arguing that impeachment should be limited to criminal
offenses).
6. See HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESI-
DENTIAL IMPEACHMENT, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1974) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT], which states
[Tihe House has placed little emphasis on criminal conduct .... Much more
common in the articles are allegations that the officer has violated his duties or
his oath or seriously undermined public confidence in his ability to perform his
official functions. Recitals that a judge has brought his court or the judicial system
into disrepute are commonplace.
See also PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-
1805, at 99 ("Insofar as impeachment had concerned misconduct and misuse of power
rather than common law crimes, the danger of its misapplication was heightened.").
7. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1993) requires each justice or judge to take the following oath or
affirmation before performing the duties of the office:
I, [state your name], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and
that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incum-
bent upon me as [state your position] according to the best of my abilities and
understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So
help me God.
8. Although much has been written regarding impeachment, surprisingly little ap-
pears in the academic literature regarding the constitutional or prudential issues inherent
in the impeachment process. See generally PrnI B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 148-81 (1987); JAMES D. ST. CLAIR ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT (1974) [hereinafter
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process, and proposes the adequate process due. Part I considers the
framing and ratification of the Constitution's impeachment clauses.
Part II discusses the current impeachment process itself, beginning
with actions taken pursuant to the Judicial Councils Act9 and finishing
with the Senate impeachment trial. Part III describes the most recent
federal judicial impeachments of Judges Harry Claiborne, Alcee Has-
tings, and Walter Nixon. Part IV analyzes the imprudence inherent in
the current impeachment process. Section A of Part IV presents a
due process analysis, arguing that the Judicial Councils Act denies the
accused procedural due process by failing to guarantee public scrutiny
or to provide for resolution of judicial conflicts of interest. Further,
Section A explains that recusal as implemented in the impeachment
process is an inadequate remedy because recusal is largely discretion-
ary and does not provide a random selection process for the replace-
ment of recused judges. Section B of Part IV argues that the Supreme
Court's reliance on the political question doctrine as a basis to decline
review of congressional impeachment decisions directly contradicts
the reality of the substantial role judges play in impeachment under
the Judicial Councils Act. Moreover, Section B of Part IV explains
that due process protections are even more important because judicial
review of Senate impeachment proceedings is denied. Part V dis-
cusses remedies to these problems, presenting procedural safeguards
to guarantee the fairness of the process and maintain the appearance
of propriety. This Section argues that providing for judicial review of
judicial council decisions, opening investigation reports to public scru-
tiny, and creating a random selection process to address conflicts of
interest of adjudicatory judges will ensure that justice is done. Part V
also argues that consistency in the application of the political question
doctrine to federal judicial impeachment proceedings is necessary to
return the spirit of justice to the justice system.
PRESIDENT4I IMPEACHMENT]; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPEACH-
mENT. AN OVERviEw (1974); Paul S. Fenton, The Scope of the Impeachment Power, 65
Nw. U. L. REv. 719 (1970); Ronald D. Rotunda, Symposium on Judicial Discipline and
Impeachment: An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 Ky.
L.J. 707 (1988); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HAmv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1959); Note, The Exclusiveness of the Impeachment Power Under the
Constitution, 51 HARv. L. REv. 330 (1937); Note, Vagueness in the Constitution: The Im-
peachment Power, 25 STAN. L. REv. 908 (1973).
9. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332,372 (1993))
[hereinafter Judicial Councils Act].
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I. The History of the Framing and Ratification of the
Impeachment Clauses
To fully explore the impeachment process, it is necessary to un-
derstand the purpose of impeachment and the role that the Framers of
the Constitution intended impeachment to play in American society.
The issue of judicial impeachment was discussed extensively during
the Constitutional Convention. 10 The Framers grappled with the com-
peting interests of judicial independence on the one hand and the
need for judicial accountability in cases of abuse or incapacity on the
other." In deciding who should exercise the substantial power of im-
peachment, the Framers intended to distribute the power over the
several branches of government to prevent the consolidation of power
in any one branch.12 The Framers envisioned impeachment to be a
fair process-a process not subject to the whim of any one political
faction that might use it to achieve its own political ends.13 In balanc-
ing these interests, the Framers considered a number of proposals, in-
cluding one proposal to place the impeachment trial function in the
judicial branch.' 4 This proposal called for trials of impeachment to be
held in the national judiciary pursuant to the "Virginia Plan.' How-
ever, the proposal was subsequently abandoned.
After consideration of several factors, the Framers rejected the
Supreme Court as the court to ultimately decide impeachments. The
Framers believed that the Supreme Court Justices, like the judges of
the lower courts, would not possess the "degree of credit and author-
ity" necessary to persuade the public because they perceived the
group to be too small in number to adequately treat impeachment
inquisitions.1 6 Such a small group, it was thought, would be unable to
assure both justice and public tranquility.' 7 More importantly, the
10. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrrTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
159, 500, 551 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter Farrand]; NOTES OF THE DE-
BATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 49, 61, 319,
539, 577 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) [hereinafter MADISON'S NOTES].
11. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). In contemplating regulation, the Framers recognized that some accountability
should be instituted in case life-tenured, unelected judges abused their positions through
acts of treason or sheer neglect of office. Id.
12. THFE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
13. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 10, at 606.
14. Id. at 605-07.
15. Farrand, supra note 10, at 21-22.
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
17. Alexander Hamilton expanded on this view in The Federalist No. 65:
The necessity of a numerous court for the trial of impeachments is equally dic-
tated by the nature of the proceeding .... The awful discretion which a court of
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Framers were concerned that the same tribunal not try the accused
twice.18 The Framers recognized that the accused, if convicted of im-
peachment, might also be subject to criminal charges, and the Framers
did not want the same court to try both offenses. 19 In effect, the
Framers found that the same tribunal holding the ability to try both
offenses would deny the accused an impartial process. 20 Furthermore,
the Framers expressed interest in obtaining fairness for the accused.
The Framers did not want to subject the accused, through the criminal
process, to the judgment of those who may have already determined
the accused's guilt in the impeachment inquiry.2'
The Framers were also concerned that the House of Representa-
tives might abuse the power of impeachment. This was manifested in
the Framers' rejection of the traditional English practice of removal
by address. 22 That practice made judges subject to the sway of the
political winds by allowing for their speedy removal upon the insis-
tence of politicians. The Framers believed this would severely under-
mine the constitutional structure of the government because it would
reduce the power of the court to review acts of Congress. 23
However, the Framers believed the Senate possessed the ability
to remain unswayed by the "passions of the whole community" and to
make decisions based on the "real demonstrations of innocence or
guilt." 24 Thus, the Framers chose the Senate as "the court for the trial
of impeachments."25 The Senate was considered the most likely to
"allow due weight to the arguments" for and against the accused.26
impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy the most
confidential and the most distinguished characters of the community, forbids the
commitment of the trust to a small number of persons.
THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 492 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
18. Id at 399.
19. Id. ("Would it be proper that the persons, who had disposed of his fame, and his
most valuable rights as a citizen in one trial, should in another trial, for the same offence,
be also the disposers of his life and his fortune?"). See also MADISON'S NOTES, supra note
10, at 577, 605-06.
20. Alexander Hamilton notes in The Federalist No. 65 that "by making the same
persons judges in both cases, those who might happen to be the objects of prosecution
would, in a great measure, be deprived of the double security intended them by a double
trial. The loss of life and estate, would often be virtually included in a sentence.. . ." THm
FEDERALIST No. 65, at 399 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
21. Id. ("Who would be willing to stake his life and his estate upon the verdict of a
jury, acting under the auspices of judges, who had predetermined his guilt.").
22. 3 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
§ 2013, at 334-35 (1907).
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470-71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); MADiSON's NOTES, supra note 10, at 337.
24. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 10, at 337.
25. THE FEDERAuST No. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
26. Id. at 397.
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Also, the Framers apparently believed that the "power of originating
the inquiry ... ought to be lodged in the hands of one branch of the
legislative body. '2 7
The independence of the judiciary from the other branches is of
utmost importance. In addition to careful selection of the forum to try
judicial impeachments, the Framers placed protection of judicial inde-
pendence in several articles of the Constitution.28 Article III gives
judges life tenure and a promise of undiminished compensation.2 9 Ar-
ticle II provides only a limited number of reasons to justify removal of
a judge from office by impeachment. 30 Furthermore, the Framers ex-
pressly designed the impeachment process to protect judges by requir-
ing a two-thirds super-majority vote to convict.31 However, in
addition to their considerations of fairness to the accused, the Framers
also realized that the authority of the judiciary depends both on the
courage and integrity of individual judges and on the public percep-
tion of the institution as fair, impartial, and efficient.32
II. The Impeachment Process
A. The Judicial Councils Reform and the Judicial Conduct and Disability
Act of 1980
The structure of the federal court system created by the Constitu-
tion focused on judicial independence, making judges autonomous in
most actions. Because the sphere of the judiciary was considered sa-
cred, developing regulation of federal judicial action was a slow pro-
cess. Modem regulation of the federal judiciary is codified in the
Judicial Councils Act and is the result of nearly fifty years of consider-
ation by Congress and the federal judiciary of the best means by
which to assure responsible judicial conduct, while remaining consis-
tent with the constitutionally protected independence of the judicial
branch.33
27. Id.
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
29. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensa-
tion, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONsr. art.
III,§ 1.
30. "[AII civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Im-
peachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemean-
ors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470-71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
33. For a complete history of the purpose of the Judicial Councils Act, see Stephen B.
Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct
and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. Rnv. 283 (1982), and Michael J. Remington,
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
FEDERAL JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT
Prior to the Judicial Councils Act, the first grant of authority for
judicial self-policing was found in the Administrative Office Act of
1939.34 The Act stated that a judicial council for each circuit would
"make all necessary and appropriate orders for the effective and expe-
ditious administration of justice within its circuit courts."35 The Act
separated the management of the federal judiciary from the executive
branch and specifically authorized the judicial councils to control judi-
cial assignments and set standards for judicial ethics.3 6 The revision of
the Judicial Code in 1948 further expanded the role of judges in judi-
cial policing. In the 1948 revision, the judicial councils were author-
ized to issue direct orders and actually discipline fellow judges based
on case backlog and physical or mental disability.37 However, even
under the Act, the judicial councils ran their affairs in an ad hoc
manner.
In 1970 the Supreme Court, in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the
Tenth Circuit,38 expressed concern about the lack of specificity in the
scope of the judicial council's powers.3 9 In that case, Judge Stephen
Chandler, U.S. District Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma,
challenged the judicial council's order relieving him of all of his judi-
cial duties.40 Judge Chandler argued that the council order infringed
Circuit Council Reform A Boat Hook for Judges and Court Administrators, 1981 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 695. The National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, chaired by
Robert Kastenmeier, was commissioned to study the problems associated with the Judicial
Councils Act. Howard Mintz, It's Not Over Yet for Aguilar, THE RECORDER (San Fran-
cisco), May 6, 1994, at Al. The report, released in August 1994, endorses the current fed-
eral discipline system. Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and
Removal, 152 F.R.D. 265 (Aug. 1994) [hereinafter National Commission Report]. The com-
mission rejected a proposal to rely on a central enforcement authority that is characteristic
of state systems because of the perceived interference with judicial independence. Id, at
351.
For a collection of working papers prepared for the Commission, see Stephen B. Bur-
bank & S. Jay Plager, Foreword. The Law of Federal Judicial Discipline and the Lessons of
Social Science, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1993); Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willing, Decen-
tralized Self-Regulation, Accountability, and Judicial Independence Under the Federal Judi-
cial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 25 (1993); Peter M. Shane,
Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A Constitutional Analysis, 142 U. PA. L.
REv. 209 (1993); Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U.
PA. L. REv 243 (1993); Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History of
Federal Judicial Service-and Disservice-1789-1992, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 333 (1993).
34. Administrative Office Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223, 28 U.S.C.
§ 332 (1993).
35. Id. § 332(d)(1).
36. MARY L. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENr. NoNE CALLED FOR JUSTICE 9-10
(1993).
37. Id. at 10.
38. 398 U.S. 74, 86 (1970).
39. Id. at 85 n.6.
40. Id. at 82.
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on his constitutional powers as a judge and encroached on Congress's
constitutional impeachment power.4a However, the Supreme Court
refused to decide the question of the constitutionality of the broad
powers afforded the judiciary, instead resting its opinion on the insuf-
ficiency of Judge Chandler's case.42
Against this abstract backdrop, and despite the lack of previously
condoned judiciary engagement in lengthy investigations, the Judicial
Councils Act of 1980 was born. Congress noted that "[t]he goals of
the... legislation are to improve judicial accountability and ethics, to
promote respect for the principle that the appearance of justice is an
integral element of this country's system of justice, and, at the same
time, to maintain the independence and autonomy of the judicial
branch of Government."
43
To this aim, the Act allows for the formation of a judicial council
for each circuit in accordance with the prior system. Additionally, the
Judicial Councils Act creates a tribunal parallel to the court system for
the adjudication of complaints against judges. The Judicial Councils
Act permits any person to file a complaint against a judge for "con-
duct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts." 44 A copy of the complaint is filed with the
appropriate circuit court and is first reviewed by the chief judge of the
circuit or by the senior circuit judge if the chief judge is the object of
the complaint.45 A copy of the complaint is also sent to the accused
judge.46 The chief judge must expedite the review of the complaint if
the complaint relates directly to the merits of a specific decision or, if
"frivolous," the complaint must be immediately dismissed.47 A com-
plaint will also be dismissed if appropriate corrective action has been
taken.48 However, if the complaint is so complex that the chief judge
of a circuit cannot address it easily, the complaint is referred to a spe-
cial committee of district and circuit judges (the investigating commit-
tee) whom the chief judge appoints.49 The committee of judges
conducts an investigation into the complaint, reports its findings, and
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. H.R. REP. No. 1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980); 126 CONG. REc. S13,858 (daily
ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (1993).
45. Id. § 372(c)(2).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 372(c)(3)(A).
48. Id. § 372(c)(3)(B).
49. Id. § 372(c)(4)(A)-(C). If, after receiving a complaint regarding the conduct of a
judge, the Chief Judge does not dismiss that complaint, the Chief Judge "shall promptly
appoint himself and equal numbers of circuit and district judges of the circuit to a special
committee to investigate the facts and allegations contained in the complaint." Id.
§ 372(c)(4)(A).
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recommends remedial measures to the judicial council of the circuit.
The judicial council is then charged with the task of conducting addi-
tional investigations, if necessary, and implementing remedial meas-
ures such as certifying the judge's disability, directing the judge to
retire voluntarily, suspending the judge's calendar, issuing a private or
public censure or reprimand, or taking any other action deemed ap-
propriate.50 Should the judicial council determine that the complaint
against the judge rises to a level possibly warranting impeachment, the
council must transfer the complaint along with the record of proceed-
ings to the Judicial Conference of the United States.51 The Judicial
Conference is chaired by the Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court and includes the chief judge of each circuit court.
5 2
The Judicial Conference is empowered to review the record and insti-
tute its own independent investigation.53 To aid their investigatory
functions, both the judicial council and the Judicial Conference are
endowed with "full subpoena powers."5 4
The results of the judicial investigations are kept confidential; pa-
pers, documents, and records of proceedings may not be disclosed by
any person.55 However, the Judicial Councils Act allows for a judicial
council, in its discretion, to release a copy of a report of an investiga-
tory committee to the complainant whose complaint initiated the in-
vestigation.5 6 Additionally, the various branches involved in the
impeachment proceeding may act to release material necessary to fur-
ther an ongoing impeachment investigation, or documents may be re-
leased at the discretion of the judicial council if such disclosure is
50. Id. § 372(c)(6).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(7)(B) (1993) states:
In any case in which the judicial council determines, on the basis of a complaint
and an investigation under this subsection, or on the basis of information other-
wise available to the council, that a judge appointed to hold office during good
behavior has engaged in conduct-(i) which might constitute one or more
grounds for impeachment under Article I of the Constitution; ... the judicial
council shall promptly certify such determination, together with any complaint
and a record of any associated proceedings, to the Judicial Conference of the
United States.
52. The Judicial Conference is formed as follows:
The Chief Justice of the United States shall summon annually the chief judge of
each judicial circuit, the chief judge of the Court of International Trade, and a
district judge from each judicial circuit to a conference at such time and place in
the United States as he may designate .... If the Conference elects to establish a
standing committee, it shall be appointed by the Chief Justice and all petitions for
review shall be reviewed by that committee.
28 U.S.C. § 331 (1993).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(8)(A) (1993).
54. Id. § 372(c)(9)(A)-(B).
55. Id. § 373(c)(14).
56. Id. § 373(c)(14)(A).
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authorized in writing by the accused judge.57 A judge who is the ob-
ject of a complaint may appeal decisions of the chief judge of the cir-
cuit to the Judicial Conference. However, there is no formal judicial
review of decisions rendered in disciplinary investigations. 58
Should a judicial council determine that the alleged conduct rises
to the level requiring impeachment, and the Conference concurs, the
Conference must communicate that determination to the House of
Representatives.5 9 The House may then proceed in whatever manner
it deems appropriate. 60
B. The Congressional Role
Should the House agree with the determination of the Judicial
Conference that impeachment of a federal judge is warranted, the
House drafts articles of impeachment and votes to determine whether
the impeachment proceeding should be initiated.61 In drafting the
articles, the House reviews the record of investigations compiled by
the judicial council or the Judicial Conference. 62 Should a majority of
the members of the House determine that the accused judge's conduct
warrants impeachment, the articles are approved. As becomes evi-
dent from the modem impeachment cases, presented in Part III of this
Note, the vote generally results in a perfunctory "rubber stamp" of
the determination of the Judicial Conference. 63
57. Id. § 373(c)(14)(A)-(C).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10) (1993).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(8)(A) (1993) states:
If the Judicial Conference concurs in the determination of the council, or makes
its own determination, that consideration of impeachment may be warranted, it
shall so certify and transmit the determination and the record of proceedings to
the House of Representatives for whatever action the House of Representatives
considers to be necessary.
Curiously, section 372(c) of the Judicial Councils Act relating to investigation and im-
peachment recommendations does not apply to Justices of the United States Supreme
Court.
60. Id.
61. See CHARLEs A. BLACK, JR., IMPEAcHmENT: A HANDBOOK 6-9 (1974).
62. Id.
63. The congressional delegation of the authority to investigate judicial conduct war-
ranting impeachment to the judicial branch is constitutionally suspect. It has been noted
that although the final decision to impeach remains in the House, substantial weight must
be given to a recommendation of impeachment from the Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court and the chief judges of all of the federal circuit courts. Hastings v. Judicial
Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988). In that case, Judge D.H.
Ginsberg, Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit, speaking for the majority
found that the certification from the Judicial Conference to the House of Representatives
that impeachment of a judge may be warranted was harmless because Congress might
"equally ... regard a private informant's suggestion that a judge may have committed an
impeachable offense as a matter of utmost gravity." Id. at 102-03. Judge Buckley dissented
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After articles of impeachment have been approved by the House,
they are transferred to the Senate, where a committee of Senators
conducts a trial of the accused judge.64 The House of Representatives
acts as prosecutor of the accused before the Senate committee.65 The
Senate committee compiles a record of the proceedings and presents
that record to the full Senate. The full Senate votes on whether to
impeach the judge based on the evidence in the record compiled by
from the court's treatment of the question of whether the Judicial Councils Act violates
separation of powers. Id. at 110. Arguing for a more thorough analysis of the question,
Judge Buckley noted that although any private citizen has the authority to submit a com-
plaint against a judge, the judicial councils and the Judicial Conference are the only com-
plainants with the power to support their complaint through investigations, subpoenaed
witnesses, and extensive testimony. The judge reasoned that the recommendation of im-
peachment reflecting the judgment of such an impressive collection of jurists makes it diffi-
cult for the House to exercise its role in the impeachment process independently. Id.
This is illustrated by the Hastings case. See supra Part M.B. The judicial council's
hired attorney, John Doar, worked for 6,000 hours investigating Judge Hastings. Jack Bass,
Why the Alcee Hastings Case Is Still Not Settled, WASH. PosT, Jan. 10, 1993, at C4. The
council also took testimony from more than 112 witnesses before it recommended im-
peachment proceedings. Id.
It has been argued that judicial participation in the process "exploits the Framers'
blending of governmental powers" by "allow[ing] the judicial branch to serve as an expert
witness for or against one of its members."' Elbert P. Tuttle & Dean W. Russell, Preserving
Judicial Integrity: Some Comments on the Role of the Judiciary Under the "Blending" of
Powers, 37 EMORY L.i. 587, 610 (1988). The recommendation by the Judicial Conference
is characterized as "testimony," which the House is free to give any weight it wishes. Id.
However, this view ignores the prosecutorial nature of an impeachment investigation and
the explicit intent of the Framers that the legislature should initiate impeachments. Alex-
ander Hamilton states in The Federalist No. 65:
Is [impeachment] not designed as a method of National Inquest into the conduct
of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the inquisitors
for the nation as the representatives of the nation themselves? It is not disputed
that the power of originating the inquiry, or in other words, of preferring the
impeachment, ought to be lodged in the hands of one branch of the legislative
body ....
THE FEDERALisT No. 65, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
64. The Senate trial procedure was adopted by the Senate in 1935 to streamline the
Senate impeachment trial system. The Rule XI evidence committee was not used until the
impeachment of Harry Claiborne in 1986. See infra Part 11(A) (discussing the impeach-
ment of Harry Claiborne) and infra Part IV(B) (discussing the Supreme Court's treatment
of Senate trial by committee).
65. BLAcK, supra note 61, at 9. One scholar has used the "prosecutor" analogy to
describe the actions of the House in investigating alleged judicial misconduct. Id. at 5-9.
See also CONGRESSIONAL QUAluLY, IMEACHMENT AND THE U.S. CONGRESS 17 (Mar.
1974) (noting the "prosecutorial" role of the House in investigating impeachments and
presenting the articles of impeachment to the Senate for trial); Black, supra note 61, at 7-8
(noting the prior procedure of the House to use one of its own committees to investigate
possible impeachable conduct; such committee investigations were generally conducted
with testimony and documents available through subpoena). This investigative power
given to committees, as described by Black, is remarkably similar to the authority granted
the judiciary through the Judicial Councils Act.
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the committee.66 If two-thirds of the Senate votes to convict the judge
on any of the articles of impeachment, the judge is impeached. 67
Ill. The Modern Impeachment Cases
Since 1986 there have been three impeachments. Because judges
are ideally men and women of unusually high integrity, it is not sur-
prising that prior to those three impeachments there had not been one
in fifty years. 68 The modem impeachment cases provide a framework
for a discussion of the problems associated with the current impeach-
ment process.
A. Judge Harry E. Claiborne
The first of the recent impeachments was the case of Judge Harry
E. Claiborne of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada.69
In 1983 a federal grand jury indicted Judge Claiborne for bribery, tax-
fraud, and false statements.70 His first trial ended in a mistrial.71 The
prosecutors then dropped the charges relating to bribery and retried
the judge on the unrelated tax fraud and false filing counts.72
Throughout the proceedings, the Judge asserted that he was the victim
of a prosecutorial vendetta due to his rulings adverse to the Depart-
ment of Justice in criminal cases.73 In the second trial, Judge Clai-
66. For a discussion of the use of the Senate Committee to facilitate an impeachment
trial, see VOLCANSEK, supra note 36, at 54 (presenting the Senate impeachment trial by
committee in the context of the impeachment of Judge Harry E. Claiborne). See also infra
section III(A) (discussing the impeachment of Judge Harry E. Claiborne).
67. BLACK, supra note 61, at 9-14.
68. The impeachment of Judge Halstead Ritter occurred in 1936. CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT, supra note 6, at 48-51. In the period from 1799 to 1936, the
House of Representatives impeached just 13 federal officers. Of these, 10 were jurists.
Interestingly, all of the impeached officials have been male; no female officer has ever been
impeached. ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FoLLIES AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL
IMPEACHMENT TRIALS 9-10 (1992).
69. PROCEEDINGS OF THE U.S. SENATE IN THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF HARRY E.
CLAIBORNE, S. Doc. No. 48, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1986) [hereinafter CLAIBORNE
SENATE IMPEACHMENT].
70. United States v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463, 1464 (9th Cir. 1989).
71. United States v. Claiborne, 781 F.2d 1327, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, C.J.,
dissenting from order denying rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1120 (1986).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1328. During the impeachment debate, Senator Levin stated that "evidence
clearly suggests that the Government engaged in a pattern of selective prosecution,
prosecutorial overreaching, and perhaps intimidation of witnesses and other improprie-
ties." 132 CONG. REc. S16,823 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986). It has been argued that the Judi-
cial Councils Act, as it stands, encourages the political targeting of controversial and
outspoken judges. Drew E. Edwards, Comment, Judicial Misconduct and Politics in the
Federal System: A Proposal for Revising the Judicial Councils Act, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1071
(1987).
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borne was acquitted of false filing, but was convicted on the charge of
tax fraud.74 A specially selected panel of three judges from other cir-
cuits affirmed his conviction.75 Judge Claiborne requested that his
post-conviction appeal be heard en banc, 76 but his request was de-
nied.77 After the Judicial Conference recommended that impeach-
ment might be warranted, the House of Representatives drew up
articles of impeachment for Judge Claiborne, based largely on his ear-
lier criminal conviction,78 and referred the articles to the Senate. The
Senate tried Judge Claiborne by committee and convicted him of
three of the articles of impeachment against him.79
B. Judge Alcee Hastings
The case of Alcee Hastings,80 former U.S. District Judge for the
Southern District of Florida, presents a unique situation. In 1979
Judge Alcee Hastings became the first African-American judge to be
appointed to the federal bench in Florida.81 In 1981 Judge Hastings
was indicted for conspiring to receive a bribe.82 Judge Hastings was
acquitted of all criminal charges,83 while his alleged coconspirator was
Judge Claiborne argued that this vendetta would result in "chilling" judicial indepen-
dence if the prosecutors were successful. Claiborne, 870 F.2d at 1465. For a detailed discus-
sion of the adverse affect of stifling judicial decision making, see Irving R. Kaufman,
Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681 (1979).
74. Claiborne, 870 F.2d at 1464.
75. United States v. Claiborne, 765 F.2d 784, 784 (9th Cir. 1985).
76. Claiborne, 781 F.2d at 1329 (Reinhardt CJ., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1325 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
78. CLAmORNE SENATE IMPEACHMENT, supra note 69, at 14-15.
79. Id.
80. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988) [hereinafter Hastings III]; Hastings v. Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, 657 F. Supp. 672 (D.D.C. 1986), affd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds sub. norn. In re Certain Complaints under Investigation by an Investigating
Committee of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied sub nom. Hastings v. Godbold, 477 U.S. 904 (1986) [hereinafter Hastings I1];
Hastings v. Judicial Conference, 593 F. Supp. 1371 (D.D.C. 1984), affd in part and vacated
in part, 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 447 U.S. 904 (1986) [hereinafter Has-
tings 1]; In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 576 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.
Fla. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1261 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Hastings v. Investi-
gating Committee for the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 469 U.S. 884 (1984)
[hereinafter Hastings Petition].
81. Hastings I, 593 F. Supp. at 1375 (1984); see also Alcee Hastings Impeachment In-
quiry: Hearings on H. Res. 128 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988) [hereinafter Hastings House
Impeachment].
82. Hastings I, 593 F.Supp. at 1375.
.83. Id. at 1376.
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convicted in a separate trial.84 Judge Hastings alleged that racial dis-
crimination within the Justice Department was the motivation behind
the case.85 Following his acquittal, two of Judge Hastings's col-
84. United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905
(1983).
It has been noted that impeachment is an independent inquiry, and an impeachable
offense may include a noncriminal act. However, the incidence of independent judicial
investigation has been diminished when impeachment follows a criminal conviction. See
VOLCANSEK, supra note 36, at 140. This trend was codified in the Judicial Councils Act:
If a judge ... has been convicted of a felony and has exhausted all means of
obtaining direct review of the conviction . . . the Judicial Conference may, by
majority vote and without referral or certification [from the judicial council,]...
transmit to the House of Representatives a determination that consideration of
impeachment may be warranted ....
Judicial Councils Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 402(d) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 372(c)(8) (1993)). This approach was first advocated by Robert N. Kastenmeier (Mem-
ber of Congress and Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice) and Michael J. Remington
(Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Jus-
tice) in Symposium on Judicial Discipline and Impeachment, Judicial Discipline: A Legisla-
tive Perspective, 76 Ky. L.J. 763, 784 (1988). See also Michael J. Broyde, Expediting
Impeachment Removing Article III Federal Judges After Criminal Conviction, 17 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 157, 158 (1994) (arguing that the House of Representatives should es-
tablish an objective standard for "automatic" impeachment of federal judges who have
been convicted of certain crimes in federal court); Maria Simon, Bribery and Other Not So
"Good Behavior": Criminal Prosecution as a Supplement to Impeachment of Federal
Judges, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1619 (1994) (arguing that the removal and disqualifica-
tion of an Article III judge convicted under a federal criminal statute supports the removal
of that judge from office without resorting to the impeachment mechanism at all).
85. See The Perplexing Case of Judge Alcee Hastings, WASH. PosT, July 7, 1988, at C1.
This allegation presents an interesting issue. It is significant that of the five criminal judi-
cial convictions since 1980, three of the judges are minorities. This is a disparate ratio
considering the minuscule number of minorities within the federal judiciary. The other two
cases not addressed in this Note either have not yet or will not reach impeachment. One
concerns Judge Robert P. Collins of the Eastern District of Louisiana, who was convicted
of accepting a bribe. The other case involves Judge Robert P. Aguilar of the Northern
District of California, convicted of an unlawful wiretap disclosure. See Robert S. Peck,
Jurist Before the Bench, Challenging Impeachment Procedures for Federal Judges, A.B.A.
J., Feb. 1993, at 60. Judge Collins is currently in prison, having exhausted all appeals. See
United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, Collins v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993). On June 22, 1993, the Judicial Conference certified to the
House of Representatives that impeachment of Collins may be warranted. However,
Judge Collins resigned his office upon exhaustion of his appeals. National Commission
Report, supra note 33, at 74.
Judge Aguilar's case presents a different matter. On April 19, 1994, an en banc panel
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned Judge Aguilar's
convictions on all counts. United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1487 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
granted 115 S. Ct. 571 (1994). Nevertheless, Judge Agnilar may still face the judicial coun-
cil, which must decide whether and to what extent the Judge should be disciplined. How-
ard Mintz, It's Not Over Yet for Aguilar, THE RECORDER (San Francisco), May 6, 1994, at
Al.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
leagues86 filed a complaint alleging, among other things, that Judge
Hastings had committed the crime for which he was charged.87 Pursu-
ant to the Judicial Councils Act, the Chief Judge of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit appointed a committee to investigate the complaint.8 8 Judge
Hastings fied four lawsuits to enjoin the investigation, yet was denied
relief.89 The judicial investigating committee hired an investigative
team charged with the task of compiling a record of the events sur-
rounding Hastings's case.90 The investigating committee hearings
were not limited by the rules of evidence. 91 The committee concluded
that Hastings was guilty of the bribery charge and unanimously rec-
ommended that impeachment of Hastings might be warranted. 92 The
committee certified its findings to the Judicial Conference.93 The
Conference reviewed the documents and voted to recommend Has-
86. The complaining judges were Judge William Terrell Hodges of the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida and Chief Judge Anthony A. Alaimo of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Both are members of the Eleventh
Circuit Judicial Council. Hastings 1, 593 F. Supp. at 1376 n.11.
87. Id. at 1376 ("Confronted with the fact that Judge Hastings was the only alleged co-
conspirator, the Court determined in affirming the jury's conviction of Borders on the con-
spiracy count that the jury must have on all the evidence properly concluded that Judge
Hastings had conspired with Borders."). The complaining judges also alleged that Judge
Hastings:
(2) ... made "public and unfounded statements" that the United States was pros-
ecuting him on racial/political grounds; (3) ... knowingly and publicly exploited
his judicial position.., by accepting financial donations from lawyers and other
members of the public to defray the costs of his criminal defense; (4) ... had
allowed ex parte contacts between his law clerk and counsel ... and had "com-
pletely abdicated and delegated" his judicial decision-making authority to his law
clerk; (5) ... told counsel in a judicial proceeding that he had read an important
precedent when he knew he had not... (6) ... exploited his judicial position by
soliciting funds for.., a convicted federal offender.
Id. at 1376-77.
88. Id. at 1377. The investigating committee of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh
Circuit consisted of John C. Godbold, Chief Judge of the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Circuit
Judges Gerald Bard Tjoflat and Frank M. Johnson, and U.S. District Judges Sam C. Pointer
and William C. O'Kelley. The committee named John Doar, a private attorney, as its
counsel. Id. at 1377.
89. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 841 F.2d 1048 (11th Cir. 1988) (before Judges
Gilbert S. Merritt, Nathaniel R. Jones, and Ralph B. Guy of the Sixth Circuit); In re Re-
quest for Access to Grand Jury Materials, 833 F.2d 1438, 1439 (11th cir. 1987) (before the
same panel); In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of
the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488, 1491 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1986)
(before Chief Judge Levin H. Campbell of the First Circuit, Judge Amalya Lyle Kearse of
the Second Circuit, and Wilbur F. Pell of the Seventh Circuit), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904
(1986); In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 735 F.2d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir. 1984).
90. See Hastings 1, 593 F. Supp. at 1377; see also VOLCANSEK, supra note 36, at 87.
91. VOLCANSEK, supra note 36, at 87.
92. Hastings I1, 829 F.2d at 96.
93. Id.
FEDERAL JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENTJanuary 1995]
tings's impeachment to the House of Representatives. 94 The House
then held additional hearings, found that there was sufficient evidence
to impeach,95 and sent the articles to the Senate. The Senate commit-
tee took testimony and prepared a report for the full Senate,96 which
voted to impeach Hastings. Hastings vociferously contested the im-
peachment proceedings at every stage, from the judicial investigating
committee hearings under the Judicial Councils Act to the Senate trial
by committee pursuant to Senate Rule XI. Through federal court liti-
gation, he vigorously challenged the Senate's use of a committee to
hear the evidence against him instead of allowing him to present his
case before the full Senate. Judge Sporkin, District Judge for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, held that a life-tenured, Article III judge who has
been acquitted of felony charges cannot thereafter be impeached and
tried on essentially the same charge by a committee of Senators con-
sisting of less than the full Senate.97 Ironically, once acquitted of the
impeachment, Judge Hastings was elected to the United States House
of Representatives, where he currently serves the Twenty-third Dis-
trict of Florida as a member of the body that impeached him.
C. Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr.
The case against Walter L. Nixon, Jr.,98 adds another dimension
to the criticism of the impeachment process. In 1984 Judge Nixon,
94. Id.; Congress Reluctantly Takes up Hastings' Ouster, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 30, 1987,
at 2; H.R. Res. 128, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), 133 CONG. R1c. H1506, H1514 (daily ed.
Mar. 23, 1987) ("[O]n March 17, 1987, Chief Justice Rehnquist, acting on behalf of the
Judicial Conference, transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives a deter-
mination that the impeachment of United States District Judge Al Hastings may be
warranted.").
95. H. Res 499, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
96. REPORT OF THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMM. ON THE ARTICLES AGAINST JUDGE
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, S. REP. No. 156, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) [hereinafter HAS-
TINGS SENATE IMPEACHMENT]. Hastings also sought injunctive relief from the District of
Columbia District Court during the Senate trial. Hastings v. United States Senate, 716 F.
Supp. 38, 39 (D.D.C. 1989), affd, 887 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989). District Judge Gerhard
Gesell dismissed the claim, finding that Hastings failed to establish a clear constitutional
violation. Id. at 43. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed,
stating that Hastings's challenges were not ripe. Hastings v. United States Senate, 887 F.2d
332 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
97. Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490, 505 (D.D.C. 1992). In that case, Judge
Sporkin found that Hastings's objection to the Senate committee was not precluded by the
grant of certiorari in Nixon v. United States (see infra Part III.C), which presented an
identical issue. Id. at 493. Nevertheless, on March 2, 1993, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals vacated Judge Sporkin's decision without opinion. Hastings v. United States,
988 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon, Judge
Sporkin dismissed the action on October 21, 1993 in a brief opinion. Hastings v. United
States, 837 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1993).
98. See Nixon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D.D.C. 1990), aftd, 938 F.2d 239
(D.C. Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
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formerly the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi, was indicted on one count of bribery
and three counts of perjury before a grand jury.99 He was acquitted of
the bribery charge and one count of the perjury charge, but was con-
victed on the other two counts of perjury.1' ° Judge Nixon noted the
irony of the perjury convictions-he was convicted of perjury based
on statements he made to the grand jury supporting his innocence of
the bribery charge.' 0' Judge Nixon's convictions were upheld on ap-
peal.10 2 Even in the face of a criminal conviction, Judge Nixon refused
to resign his judicial position. He, like Judge Claiborne, contended
that he was being unjustifiably prosecuted based upon controversial
rulings against the government.103 Despite that claim, the House of
Representatives approved three articles of impeachment against
Judge Nixon.10 4 The Senate, pursuant to Senate Procedural Rule XI,
appointed a twelve-member committee to receive and report evi-
dence. The committee conducted four days of hearings, received testi-
mony from ten witnesses including Nixon, and then submitted a
transcript and summary of its proceedings to the full Senate. The Sen-
ate convicted him of two of the three articles' 05 and removed him
from office. 0 6
Nixon brought an action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia challenging Senate Rule XI, which author-
ized the use of a committee to hear impeachment trials.'0 7 Nixon ar-
gued that the Constitution required the full Senate to try his
impeachment, instead of the twelve-member committee of Sena-
99. Nixon, 744 F. Supp. at 10.
100. Id.
101. Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993); Walter
L. Nixon Impeachment Inquiry: Hearings on H. Res. 407 Before Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 979-80 (1988) (app. 1, no. 96) [hereinafter
Nixon House Impeachment].
102. United States v. Nixon, 816 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1987); see also United States v.
Nixon, 881 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1989) (affirming lower court's denial of judge's motion to
vacate conviction); United States v. Nixon, 827 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1987) (denying petition
for rehearing en banc); Nixon v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 538 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (denying
motion to vacate conviction).
103. One relevant case is the land condemnation case of Petit Bois Island in the Gulf of
Mexico, in which Nixon ruled that the government was liable for more than six million
dollars in damages. United States v. 717.42 Acres of Land, C.A. No. S80-0450(N) (S.D.
Miss), cited in Nixon House Impeachment, supra note 101, at 1156-57.
104. Nixon, 744 F. Supp. at 10.
105. Id. at 10.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 9. Senate Rule XI allows the appointment of "a committee of Senators to
receive evidence and take testimony," which then compiles a transcript of the proceedings,
testimony, and all evidence upon which the full Senate votes. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
PRACTICE IN TE SENATE WHEN SrrrMG ON IMPEACHmENT TRLAis XI, XXII, reprinted in
SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 1, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 186-87, 188 (1989).
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tors.10 8 He also claimed that because the full Senate had failed to
perform the fact-finding inherent in a trial, the Senate had failed to
"try" him pursuant to the constitutional mandate. 0 9 The District
Court dismissed his claim as a nonjusticiable political question."10
Nixon appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.' The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the decision
of the district court, with each judge of the three-judge panel writing
separately."12 In the opinion for the court, Judge Williams based his
finding of nonjusticiability on his reading of the text and history of the
Impeachment Trial Clause."13 Judge Randolph concurred, finding re-
view of the Senate impeachment rules to be nonjusticiable based on
prudential separation of powers concerns. 14 Judge Edwards con-
curred in part and dissented in part, finding the question justiciable,
but determining on the merits that the Senate had indeed tried
Nixon.1 5 Nixon further appealed his case to the U.S. Supreme
Court,1 6 which affirmed his conviction, relying on the elusive political
question doctrine.1 7
108. Nixon, 744 F. Supp. at 10. The constitutionality of Senate impeachment by com-
mittee is beyond the scope of this Note. However, this issue is discussed in depth by sev-
eral commentators. See Rose Auslander, Note, Impeaching the Senate's Use of Trial
Committees, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 68 (1992) (observing that the text of the Constitution and
the history of the Framers' intent suggest that the full Senate is required to hear impeach-
ments); Daniel Luchsinger, Note, Committee Impeachment Trials: The Best Solution?, 80
GEO. L.J. 163 (1991) (arguing that the current committee procedure is unconstitutional and
proposing a revision allowing the committee to make the initial determination as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused). But see Mitch McConnell, Reflections on the Senate's
Role in the Judicial Impeachment Process and Proposals for Change, 76 Ky. L.J. 739 (1988)
(arguing that significant economies are achieved in the Senate through the committee pro-
cedure without abdicating any of its responsibilities to hear, consider, and judge before
convicting).
109. Nixon, 744 F. Supp. at 10.
110. Id. at 14. When a political question is found, the case will involve
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrass-
ment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
111. Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J., with Ran-
dolph, J., concurring, and Edwards, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment).
112. Id. at 246.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 246-48 (Randolph, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 248-65 (Edwards, J. dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment).
116. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
117. Id. at 734.
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IV. Toward Due Process Guarantees in the Impeachment
Process
Because the Constitution does not define the words within it pre-
cisely, it is within the province of the judiciary to define those
terms.118 The Nixon Court's decision to abdicate this duty through
the use of the political question doctrine leaves a process with no
check on the rules of Congress, thus upsetting the delicate system of
checks and balances established in the United States Constitution.119
The political nature of the initiation of impeachments 20 and the mag-
nitude of the consequences of impeachment' 2' justifies a thorough
probing into the necessity of impeachment in each case. Honesty,
consistency, and fairness should be guarantees of our impeachment
process; instead, they are left to happenstance.
A. Due Process
Both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
prohibit governmental actions that would deprive any person of cer-
tain entitlements.'22 The employment of the Judicial Councils Act
does not override the protection afforded accused judges by the Fifth
118. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
119. The justiciability of legislative impeachment rules has been discussed extensively
in the academic literature. See generally Thomas D. Amrine, Comment, Judicial Review of
Impeachment Proceedings, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 809 (1993); Auslander, supra note
108, at 107 (noting that the political question doctrine should not bar judicial review of
Senate impeachment rules); Brendan C. Fox, Note, ImpeachmenL" The Justiciability of
Challenges to the Senate Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Trials, 60 GEo. WASH. L.
Rv. 1275, 1310 (1992) ("The political question doctrine should not act as a bar to the
justiciability of impeachment procedure claims under the classic Baker v. Carr standards
...."); Lisa A. Kainec, Note, Judicial Review of Senate Impeachment Proceedings: Is a
Hands OffApproach Appropriate?, 43 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 1499 (1993) (arguing that the
Supreme Court should review Senate Impeachment rules); Michael Miller, Comment, The
Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the "Political" Political Question Doctrine, 78 CALn=.
L. REv. 1341 (1990) (arguing courts should intervene when private litigants are involved);
Nicole H. Schneider, Comment, Senate Impeachment Trials-To Review or Not To Review,
What Would Marshall Do?, 4 SETON HALL CONST. LJ. 237 (1993) (arguing in favor of the
justiciability of Senate impeachment trial rules); David Todd Smith, Note, Constitutional
Law-Impeachment Trial Clause, 25 ST. MARY's LJ. 855 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme
Court should review legislative rules in extreme circumstances).
120. See Tm FEDERALLr No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
121. An impeachment conviction results in expulsion from the judiciary and the subse-
quent loss of salary, pensions, and other benefits ordinarily due. See THm FEDERAUST No.
65, at 399 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (acknowledging the grave
loss of livelihood and estate in an impeachment trial).
122. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the guarantee
that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Amendment. However, the Act's procedures deny accused judges the
procedural protections of a neutral decision maker, judicial review of
the process, and public access to investigation findings, in contraven-
tion of due process.
To ascertain an individual's entitlement to due process, the U.S.
Supreme Court applies a two-pronged analysis. The Court first asks
whether life, liberty, or property are implicated, and if so, then asks
what process is due.123 Article III judges are granted constitutionally
protected life tenure and salary protection, both of which are property
interests under the Constitution, and are therefore entitled to due pro-
cess before their removal.124
In determining whether procedural protection is due, courts look
to the extent to which the individual will be "condemned to [suffer]
grievous loss. '125 This examination includes consideration of the pre-
cise nature of the government function involved, and the private inter-
est that has been affected by the government action.126 When due
process is implicated, the individual has a right to "a fair procedure"
to determine the basis for and legality of the government's action.127
Because determinations of what and how much process is due are
flexible, the specific dictates of due process requirements have been
condensed to consideration of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of ad-
ditional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.128
When these factors are applied to the impeachment process, the only
conclusion is that the Judicial Councils Act falls to accord an accused
judge the full panoply of due process protections.
First, because Article III judges are constitutionally guaranteed
salary protection and life tenure, such judges have a strong private
interest. Judges risk losing their reputations as a result of a finding of
misconduct, and their futures as jurists are threatened. Sanctions a
judge may face range from a suspension of duties to a recommenda-
123. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.1 [herein-
after NOWAK & ROTUNDA].
124. A property interest has been found when an employee has tenure in her position.
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972).
125. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
126. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
127. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 123, § 13.1, at 487.
128. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
127 (1990).
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tion of impeachment-each of which jeopardizes the jurist's future
ability to conduct the business of the courts by diminishing the public
confidence in the judge's integrity. Impeachment will likely also ham-
per the jurist's ability to gain future employment, as it carries with it
the stigma of having betrayed the public trust.
Other factors affecting the amount of process due arise differ-
ently at two distinct points in the impeachment process-first, during
the judicial council investigation of an accused judge, and second,
when an accused judge challenges any part of the process through the
federal courts.
(1) The Judicial Council Investigation Under the Judicial Councils Act
The second factor in determining the requirements of due process
is the risk of erroneous deprivation. The risk of such deprivation in
impeachment proceedings is substantial. Three particular aspects of
the impeachment process increase this risk: the lack of meaningful
judicial review of the impeachment process; the relative sophistication
and secrecy with which judicial impeachment investigations are con-
ducted; and the lack of an effective mechanism to deal with conflicts
of interest between the accused judges and the investigating judges.
Although the investigating committee is composed of federal
judges who are often more sophisticated than lay people, the decision-
making process can become strained. Judicial review on appeal is ac-
knowledged as a necessary component of American jurisprudence be-
cause a multi-layered approach to adjudications is often appropriate
and helpful in guaranteeing fairness to litigants. Nevertheless, in Judi-
cial Council proceedings, judicial review is explicitly precluded. 129
Although the statute notes that a judge may appeal a decision of a
judicial council to the Judicial Conference, it is still within the discre-
tion of the Judicial Conference to accept or reject the appeal, leaving
an accused judge with no recourse. 130 This is exacerbated by the geo-
129. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10) (1993) states:
A complainant, judge, or magistrate aggrieved by a final order of the chief judge
under paragraph (3) of this subsection may petition the judicial council for review
thereof. A complainant, judge, or magistrate aggrieved by an action of the judi-
cial council under paragraph (6) of this subsection may petition the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States for review thereof. The judicial conference, or the
standing committee .... may grant a petition filed by a complainant, judge, or
magistrate under this paragraph. Except as expressly provided in this paragraph,
all orders and determinations, including denials of petitions for review shall be
final and conclusive and shall not be judicially reviewable on appeal or otherwise.
130. Judge Edwards, Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit, noted the
problematic nature of the language of section 373(c)(10), stating that because this language
could be construed as precluding review of challenges to the legality of the decision-mak-
ing processes of judicial councils, due process could be denied an accused judge. Hastings
1, 770 F.2d at 1109 (Edwards, J., concurring). Despite the lack of a definitive statement
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graphic proximity of the judges selected to serve on the investigating
committee. Because the judges are all selected from the accused
judge's circuit, disparate treatment of like cases based on personal as-
sociations is possible. Without judicial review, these biases are un-
likely to be effectively countered.
The risk of erroneous deprivation is further enhanced by the na-
ture of the impeachment investigation of an accused judge. The issues
of judicial competence or misconduct are highly fact-specific. Never-
theless, because misconduct is often private and therefore not obvi-
ous, the alleged misconduct may be difficult to establish. Thus, in
impeachment proceedings, it may be necessary to engage the assist-
ance of investigators, in addition to commanding information through
the subpoena power granted investigating committees. This is particu-
larly true when the investigation does not follow a criminal conviction.
Additionally, the Judicial Councils Act allows judicial investiga-
tions to be conducted under a shroud of secrecy.' 31 Public scrutiny is
a significant deterrent to misconduct of any sort. Public knowledge of
the actions of investigating committees, in addition to Judicial Council
recommendations as the scheme currently requires, would bolster
public confidence in the judiciary by mitigating the appearance of
either partiality toward or persecution of judges under investigation.
The risk of erroneous deprivation of the judge's property interest
is likewise increased because the Act fails to provide a procedure for
resolving conflicts of interest among investigating committee members
and the accused.132 "The government always has the obligation of
providing a neutral decision-maker-one who is not inherently biased
against the individual or who has personal interest in the outcome.'
33
However, within a judicial council's disciplinary hearings, once judges
have been selected to sit on an investigating committee there is no
formal mechanism for those judges to recuse themselves, nor are there
any standards set for such recusal. Although judges are ideally men
and women of great integrity, it is likewise clear that conflicts of inter-
est do occur. Judges of the same circuit may find it inappropriate to
from the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the Judicial Councils Act, courts have
allowed facial challenges to the Act. At least one court has disallowed an individual
judge's challenge to the Act as applied to him. Hastings 1, 593 F. Supp. at 1378. Circuit
Judge D.H. Ginsberg of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated in a
footnote that "sensitive and unsettled questions of constitutional law would arise if [Judge
Hastings's] challenges are covered by the prohibition on judicial review." Hastings III, 829
F.2d at 107-08 n.69 (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975)). The court re-
manded the case to the district court, but prior to that adjudication, Hastings was im-
peached in Congress. See supra Part III.B.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14)(A)-(C) (1993); see supra Part II (discussing confidentiality
of committee disciplinary investigations).
132. See supra Part I.
133. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 123, § 13.1, at 488; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
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pass on questions of misconduct regarding one of their colleagues.
The risk that judges may protect their colleagues, or may be unjustifi-
ably harsh on their colleagues, is substantial. One judge may find that
the accused judge has been the victim of an erroneous complaint,
while another judge may find the embarrassment of judicial miscon-
duct for all of the judiciary so great that the judge may approach the
investigation with contempt. In any misconduct investigation, the
search for truth must be the underlying motivating force. If any other
factor may potentially become an issue, risk of disparate procedures is
heightened. In order to ensure that erroneous deprivations do not
occur, the Judicial Councils Act must make provisions for the conflicts
of interest that are inevitable.
In addition to conflicts of interest based on personal affiliations,
under the current system, an accused judge may face impeachment
investigation proceedings in which a judge with prior exposure to the
case is participating-the likelihood of which is increased by an imper-
fect recusal mechanism-with no possibility of judicial review or pub-
lic scrutiny. Under these procedures, "the risk of unfairness is
intolerably high."' a
Third, the considerations of due process require an appraisal of
the government's interest, including the function involved and the fis-
cal and administrative burdens that additional procedural require-
ments would entail.' 35 In the impeachment investigation context, the
government's interest is in eradicating misconduct from the judiciary
and satisfying the public's interest in limiting the administrative and
fiscal burdens imposed as a result of providing due process protections
of judicial review, public availability of decisions, and conflict of inter-
est mechanisms. The cost to the government includes the generally
small cost of allowing judicial review of the relatively few impeach-
ment investigation cases. Additionally, making the public aware of
the impeachment process should entail virtually no cost, other than
basic costs of reproduction and distribution of committee investiga-
tion reports. The conflict of interest mechanism may be more costly.
In order to provide for alternative judges to take the place of recused
judges on investigating committees, the provision of resources will be
increased somewhat. However, the relative infrequency of impeach-
ment investigations mitigates against an unmanageable cost to the
government.
Balanced against those costs are the benefits to be derived from
the preservation of the sanctity of the federal judiciary, the indepen-
dence of federal judges, and the maintenance of the confidence of the
public. The fair and just adjudication of judicial misconduct is itself a
134. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975).
135. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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benefit to the government and to society. Moreover, judges are en-
trusted with the very lives of the litigants who come before them.
Therefore, the public confidence in the federal judiciary as a whole
will be further diminished by the presence of judges whose honor has
been called into question. Finally, in the American common law sys-
tem, the decisions of federal judges must be inherently reliable in or-
der to maintain the sanctity of a system that relies heavily on
precedent. It is necessary for federal judges to trust the decisions of
their colleagues in order to preserve the sanctity of the process as a
whole.
The case of Judge Hastings is illustrative of the current due pro-
cess problems with judicial council investigations.136 Upon receipt of
the initial complaint filed against Judge Hastings, the Chief Judge ap-
pointed a committee to investigate. 137 Pursuant to the Judicial Coun-
cils Act, the Chief Judge has complete discretion to select the
investigating judges. 38 In choosing an investigating committee, the
Chief Judge of the Eleventh Circuit appointed the circuit judge who
had written the decision in the appeal of Hastings's alleged cocon-
spirator.139 The opinion in the coconspirator's appellate case "recited
in detail the evidence against Hastings"; yet this judge stayed on the
committee and heard Hastings's case. 40 The impartiality of the as-
signed judge could reasonably be questioned because of the substan-
tial likelihood that he may have already determined the guilt of the
accused. Because the disciplinary investigation is essentially un-
guarded by such standard protections as judicial review and public
scrutiny, the appointment of the judge who will decide the case is of
paramount significance. In this case, a judge intricately involved in
the alleged coconspirator's original case was chosen to participate in
the subsequent impeachment investigation, in direct contravention of
the Framers' mandate that the accused should not be subjected to the
scrutiny of one who may have predetermined a judge's guilt through
involvement in a criminal proceeding.
The Framers of the Constitution explicitly considered the rights
of accused judges and included due process protections at the fore-
front of their debates. This constitutional mandate has been circum-
vented in the impeachment process by allowing judges involved in the
determination of the guilt of an individual in a criminal proceeding to
preside in a subsequent impeachment proceeding based on the same
136. See supra Part III (discussing the most recent federal impeachment cases).
137. Id.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(4)-(5) (1993).
139. Hastings Petition, 735 F.2d at 1263-64.
140. Hastings I, 593 F. Supp. at 1376. See Borders, 693 F.2d at 1318. Interestingly,
when Hastings challenged the judge's participation as a violation of due process, the court
repeatedly failed to reach the issue.
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alleged misconduct.141 Incorporating due process safeguards into the
impeachment process will facilitate fact finding and secure the judge's
perceived due process. Failure to subject evidence to the most rigor-
ous examination possible is not only harmful to the accused judge, but
also injures the justice system by exposing it to claims of impropriety.
(2) Court Challenges to the Constitutionality and Parameters of the
Judicial Councils Act Itself
The federal judiciary's role in the impeachment process is two-
fold. Not only do Article III judges participate intimately in the inter-
nal investigation of complaints against judges, but Article III judges
also have repeatedly been called upon to determine the constitutional-
ity and parameters of the Judicial Councils Act itself. Both Judges
Claiborne and Hastings challenged the legitimacy and scope of the
Judicial Councils Act.142 Conversely, Judge Nixon rested his legal
contests on the validity of the Senate's trial by committee.143 A recur-
ring question in the Claiborne and Hastings cases was the extent to
which recusal of judges from the accused judge's circuit would have
been appropriate.1 " The propriety of circuit recusal in each case has
141. Scholars have questioned the propriety of any discipline of federal judges other
than impeachment. Compare Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Di-
vining "Good Behavior"for Federal Judges, 87 MICH. L. Rnv. 765 (1989) (arguing that any
regulation short of impeachment should be through judicial self-regulation that does not
include congressional interference); C. Randolph Fishbum, Constitutional Judicial Tenure
Legislation? The Words May be New, But the Song Sounds the Same, 8 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 843, 851 (1981) (arguing that impeachment is the sole constitutional means for re-
moval); Warren S. Grimes, Hundred-Ton-Gun Controk Preserving Impeachment as the Ex-
clusive Removal Mechanism for Federal Judges, 38 UCLA L. Ray. 1209 (1991) (arguing
that the integrity of the impeachment process is undermined if criminal prosecution of a
judge precedes impeachment); Lynn A. Baker, Note, Unnecessary and Improper: The Judi-
cial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94 YALE L.". 1117
(1985) (arguing that impeachment should be the sole method for investigating, trying, and
punishing Article III judges for noncriminal misbehavior); and Melissa H. Maxman, Note,
In Defense of the Constitution's Judicial Impeachment Standard, 86 MicH. L. Rnv. 420
(1987) (arguing that prosecuting a federal judge prior to impeachment undermines judicial
independence) with Anthony D'Amato, Self-Regulation of Judicial Misconduct Could Be
Mis-Regulation, 89 MicH. L. Ray. 609 (1990) (rejecting Judge Edwards's plea for judicial
self-regulation as unworkable due to a perceived tendency in the judicial culture to cover
up judicial misbehavior) and Patrick Donald McCalla, Note, Judicial Disciplining of Fed-
eral Judges Is Constitutional, 62 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1263 (1989) (arguing that disciplining
federal judges does not violate the Constitution).
142. See supra Parts II(A) and (B) (discussing the challenges of Claiborne and
Hastings).
143. See supra Part 11(C) (discussing Nixon's challenge to the Senate's impeachment
procedures).
144. Claiborne, 870 F.2d at 1464-67; Hastings cases, supra note 80. Judges are selected
to replace recused judges pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1993), which provides:
The Chief Justice of the United States may designate and assign temporarily any
circuit judge to act as circuit judge in another circuit upon presentation of a certif-
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been approached in an ad hoc manner, resulting in unpredictable
decisions.
Inherent in the American judicial system are mechanisms for
judges to recuse themselves from a case.' 45 A judge must preside over
a proceeding in an unbiased manner 146 and with the appearance of
impartiality. If there is an appearance of bias or partiality, judges may
recuse themselves from a particular case or be disqualified. 147 Two
broad types of situations warrant compulsory judicial disqualification:
personal bias or prejudice, either in fact or appearance, and personal
involvement by the judge in the matter or controversy.' 48
Lawyers and litigants expect that judges will recuse themselves
voluntarily when their impartiality may legitimately be questioned.
Judges are generally in a better position to determine whether to re-
cuse themselves from a case. If such potential exists, the judge will
icate of necessity by the Chief Judge of Circuit Justice of the circuit wherein the
need arises.
The Rule of Necessity requires that a forum be made available for litigants, thus prevent-
ing recusal of all Article III judges from participating in judicial council proceedings. Has-
tings Petition, 576 F. Supp at 1280 (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217 (1980)).
145. The procedures for recusal of a federal judge are outlined in 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455
(1988) and Canon 3 of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (any judge
shall be disqualified if a party to any proceeding makes and files a timely and sufficient
affidavit showing personal judicial bias or prejudice); 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (any justice, judge,
or magistrate shall disqualify him or herself in any proceeding if his or her impartiality
might reasonably be questioned). If a judge provides full disclosure on the record of the
basis why his or her impartiality may reasonably be questioned, the parties may consent to
the judge remaining on the case except in several circumstances specified in § 455(b). In
determining whether a judge should recuse him or herself, courts apply a reasonable per-
son standard. Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438 (1st
Cir. 1992) (whether the charge of lack of impartiality is grounded on facts that would cre-
ate reasonable doubt concerning judge's impartiality, not in the mind of the judge him or
herself or even necessarily in the mind of the litigant filing the motion, but rather in the
mind of the reasonable person); Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1993)
(whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned).
146. Personal bias usually refers to bias in favor of or against a specific party as op-
posed to judicial bias, which refers to prejudgment of the legal issues or merits. Seth E.
Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of Federal
Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 662, 668 (1985). See generally LESLIE ABRAMSON, JUDI-
CIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 1-3
(describing the circumstances for judicial disqualification).
147. A party seeking to disqualify a judge must make and file a timely affidavit alleging
the nature of the bias alleged. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988). The party may file only one affida-
vit in a judicial disqualification case and must include in the affidavit a statement of the
facts and reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists. See generally Note, Disqualifi-
cation of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1435 (1966).
148. Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 524 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (quoting
United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973)), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976).
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not only recognize it, but ideally will act to ensure the integrity of the
legal process.
Nevertheless, inherent problems in the impeachment process are
not relieved by the mere fact that the mechanism of recusal exists.
149
The discretionary nature of recusal leaves open the possibility that
judges with intimate familiarity with a case may still decide questions
of procedural validity relating to subsequent impeachment proceed-
ings. This practice contravenes constitutional due process require-
ments and the prudential goal of maintaining the appearance of
propriety in judicial action. Discretion inherently leads to divergent
decisions; when one judge may find that knowledge of a case or com-
munication with an accused warrants her recusal, another judge faced
with the same prior exposure may decide to continue presiding over
the case.
Judge Claibore faced the problems stemming from discretionary
recusal several times. In his initial criminal trial, an out-of-circuit se-
nior district judge was specially assigned to hear the case.150 The dis-
trict judge denied a series of pretrial motions filed by Judge
Claiborne.151 In Judge Claiborne's appeal of the pretrial rulings, the
Ninth Circuit judges agreed to recuse themselves.152 The Chief Jus-
tice then specially selected a panel of three judges from other circuits
to hear the case.153 The panel affirmed the pretrial rulings of the dis-
trict judge.154 Upon Judge Claiborne's subsequent conviction, he ap-
pealed again to the Ninth Circuit for en banc review.155 Only six of
the twenty-five circuit judges recused themselves from the vote.
156
The en banc vote represents the first time Ninth Circuit judges partici-
pated in Claibore's criminal case.157 Those judges who voted against
the en banc hearing did so because of a perceived appearance of im-
149. But cf 11Tttle & Russell, supra note 63, at 609-10 (arguing that recusal is the ap-
propriate remedy).
150. Claiborne, 781 F.2d at 1329-30 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Senior United States
District Judge Walter E. Hoffman of the Eastern District of Virginia was designated by the
Chief Justice to preside at trial.
151. Id. at 1330. The issue of one such pretrial motion was whether a federal judge
could be subjected to criminal proceedings prior to impeachment. United States v. Clai-
borne, 727 F.2d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1984). Judge Claiborne argued that because impeach-
ment is the sole method of removing federal judges from the bench, criminal prosecution
before impeachment resulted in an unconstitutional de facto removal. ld. at 846. For a
comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Steven W. Gold, Note, Temporary Criminal
Immunity for Federal Judges: A Constitutional Requirement, 53 BROOK. L. RFv. 699
(1987).





157. Claiborne, 870 F2d at 1464.
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propriety in having circuit judges from the same geographic location
as the judge on trial presiding over the case.158 This is notable be-
cause although many circuit judges recused themselves from hearing
Claiborne's pretrial motion, the majority of them subsequently con-
cluded that it was proper for them to vote on the en banc question.
Judge Reinhardt, Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, aptly recognized that "there can be no distinction drawn be-
tween the propriety of a judge's voting on a call for a hearing en banc
and the propriety of a judge's hearing the appeal itself."1 59 Further,
Judge Reinhardt notes the immense discretion afforded the Chief Jus-
tice of the United States in designating judges to preside in another
circuit. 60 Judge Reinhardt suggests a "random selection system" to
be established through procedures that are a matter of public record
to remedy this problem;' 61 however, this has not been implemented.
Noting the significance of Judge Claiborne's documented assertion of
selective prosecution and the hand-picked manner in which the judges
for his case may have been selected, the threat to the integrity of fed-
eral judges is great. The lack of consistency coupled with the absence
of an unbiased standard for selecting judges to preside over cases
compel the conclusion that subjective justice is at work; such a conclu-
sion undermines the public confidence that justice has been done.
Judge Hastings's legal challenges to the Judicial Council's author-
ity also present a curious situation. Most of Hastings's cases resulted
in the recusal of other Eleventh Circuit judges.162 At first glance this
seems adequate; however, upon closer examination it is apparent that
this was insufficient. As noted above, the Chief Justice is authorized
to choose the judges who will sit by designation. In the Hastings
158. Claiborne, 781 F.2d at 1331.
159. Id. at 1330.
160.
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court ... may
select any judge he wishes; there are no published guidelines or standards. Thus,
when a certificate of necessity is issued in a specific case or proceeding, there will
always be an appearance that the judges designated are being hand-picked to
decide the controversy.
Id. at 1333.
161. Id. Judge Claiborne's challenge to the absence of a random selection process was
rejected on appeal by Judge William A. Norris. Claiborne, 870 F.2d at 1465-67. Judge
Norris declined to pass on the prudence or fairness of such a process. Id. at 1467.
162. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 841 F.2d 1048 (11th Cir. 1988) (before Merritt,
Jones, and Guy, JJ., of the Sixth Circuit); In re Request for Access to Grand Jury Materials,
833 F.2d 1438, 1439 (11th Cir. 1987) (same panel); In re Certain Complaints Under Investi-
gation by an Investigating Comm. of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d
1488, 1491 & n.1 (11th Cir.) (before Campbell, C.J., of the First Circuit, Kearse, J., of the
Second Circuit, and Pell, J., of the Seventh Circuit), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986); In re
Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 735 F.2d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1984)
(same panel).
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cases, this was improper because the Chief Justice, in his capacity as
Chair of the Judicial Conference, was a named defendant.163
Although the name on the pleading is often of little significance to the
merits of a case, in impeachment related proceedings, naming the
Chief Justice as a defendant is more than a formality. The Chief Jus-
tice, as chair of the Judicial Conference, reviews and considers the
entire record from the judicial council in impeachment cases. More-
over, the Chief Justice, as chair of the Judicial Conference, is author-
ized to conduct additional investigations into the conduct of the
accused judge. Therefore, the Chief Justice is intimately involved in
the litigation. In its quest to guarantee a healthy, viable judiciary, this
system instead leads the public to question the fairness of the judicial
process as a whole. In such a climate as impeachment, the judicial
involvement should appear to be as nonpartisan as possible. Instead,
the current system taints the stature of the judiciary. The current pro-
cess could be initiated by a judge with a conflict of interest, the deci-
sion may be denied judicial review, and the public will be denied
access to the determinations of the judicial councils. Moreover, the
judicial council has no established mechanism for addressing chal-
lenges to judicial impeachment investigations. While the costs of rem-
edying these problems are low, the benefits are great. Public
confidence in the federal judiciary should not be undervalued.
B. The Political Question Doctrine: Cognitive Selection as
Jurisprudential Method
The judicial branch of government finds itself in a precarious po-
sition when placed in the midst of political disputes based on highly
charged controversies. In many cases, the court has invoked the jus-
ticiability doctrines to avoid involvement in politics. One justiciability
doctrine, the political question doctrine, embodies the concept that
certain matters are inherently political in nature and are best resolved
by the political branch of government and not by judicial review.164
163. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text; see also Hastings 1, 593 F. Supp. at
1376.
164. NowAx & ROTUNDA, supra note 123, § 2.15; See also supra notes 107-117 and
accompanying text. A rational basis for the political question doctrine has eluded scholars:
[T]he definition of a political question can be expanded or contracted in accor-
dion-like fashion to meet the exigencies of the times. A juridical definition of the
term is impossible, for at root the logic that supports it is circular: political ques-
tions are matters not soluble by the judicial process; matters not soluble by the
judicial process are political questions.
John P. Roche, Judicial Self-Restraint, 49 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 762, 768 (1955).
For additional commentary regarding the political question doctrine, see ROBERT
LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JuDiciAL REVIEw 76 (1989) (noting that
the Federalists and the Republicans agreed that the judicial function involved deciding
questions of a "nonpolitical" nature); CHARLus GoRDON PosT, JR., Tim SuPREmE COURT
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The difficulty with the political question doctrine lies in its absolute
finality-a holding of nonjusticiability is absolute in its foreclosure of
judicial scrutiny. Thus, reliance of a court on the political question
doctrine to resolve a dispute renders the conduct at issue immune
from scrutiny.165
Traditionally, the process of impeachment has been acknowl-
edged as a political process.166 However, the application of the polit-
ical question doctrine to federal judicial impeachment procedures is
curious given the vast involvement of the judiciary in earlier aspects of
the impeachment process.
This issue was explored more broadly in the Supreme Court's
treatment of the Nixon case.' 67 In finding Senate impeachment proce-
dures a nonjusticiable political question in the Nixon opinion, Chief
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the Constitution grants the sole au-
thority to try impeachments to the Senate. 68 The Court explained
that the word "sole" constituted a textually demonstrable commit-
ment of trial procedures to a coordinate branch of government, the
first element in finding a political question in Baker v. Carr.1
69
Searching for the meaning of the term "sole" in the impeachment trial
clause, Justice Rehnquist resorted to dictionary definitions. 170 How-
ever he ultimately relied on the "common sense meaning" of the word
sole, finding that the Senate alone should determine an individual's
impeachment fate.' 71 Based on that definition, the Court found that
AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS 11-14 (1936) (noting the unsatisfactory explanations offered by
the Supreme Court for the political question doctrine); PHILIPPA STRUM, THE SUPREME
COURT AND "PoLITICAL QUESTIONS": A STUDY IN JUDICIAL EVASION 1 (1974) ("Justices
of the Supreme Court and of lower courts ... have floundered in the quagmire of defini-
tion [of political questions]."); Miller, supra note 119 (arguing that judicial recognition of
the political nature of legislative rules should limit court interference unless a private liti-
gant is involved); Gregory Frederick Van Tatenhove, Comment, A Question of Power: Ju-
dicial Review of Congressional Rules of Procedure, 76 Ky. L.J. 597 (1987-88) (contending
that judicial review of rules of Congress should be exercised in only the most limited cir-
cumstances because of the "political tension" inherent in such involvement).
165. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 123, § 2.15.
166. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
167. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735. The Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari in
cases involving the constitutional parameters of judicial discipline and impeachment. The
grant of certiorari in this case represents the first authoritative pronouncement regarding
judicial discipline by the Supreme Court.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 735-36. See also supra note 110 (citing the standard for the political question
doctrine announced in the seminal case Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
170. The Supreme Court's use of static dictionary definitions to resolve disputes in
interpretation is increasing. For a discussion of the Court's use of the dictionary in the
Nixon case, see The Supreme Court, 1992 Term, Leading Cases, Justiciability, 107 HARv. L.
REv. 144, 298-303 (1993).
171. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735.
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the Framer's use of the word sole in the impeachment trial clause was
sufficient to foreclose judicial review of Senate procedures. 172
Likewise, the Court found a lack of a judicially manageable stan-
dard of review, the second element required to find a political ques-
tion. In defining the word "try," the Court again resorted to
dictionary definitions, but concluded that the insufficient precision of
the word "try" failed to provide the necessary manageable standards
of review.173
The Court further based its finding of nonjusticiability on consti-
tutional history, citing for support the statement that "the Judiciary,
and the Supreme Court in particular, were not chosen to have any role
in impeachments."' 74 Lending credence to this historical approach,
the Court noted that the Framers intended separate criminal and im-
peachment trials for accused officials. 175 The Court also based its de-
cision on prudential considerations and the observation that
"D]udicial involvement in impeachment proceedings, even if only for
purposes of judicial review, is counterintuitive because it would evis-
cerate the 'important constitutional check' placed on the Judiciary by
the Framers.' 76
Finally, the majority distinguished Powell v. McCormack.177 In
Powell the Court found justiciable Adam Clayton Powell's request for
review of the House of Representative's refusal to seat him. The Pow-
ell court separated Congress's nonjusticiable authority to determine a
member's constitutional qualifications of age, residency, and length of
citizenship, from its justiciable act to deny a member his seat on other
grounds. 178 The Nixon Court distinguished Powell based on a sepa-
rate constitutional clause controlling the qualifications Congress could
consider and the lack of such a clause to shape impeachment proce-
dures. 79 Justice Stevens concurred in the Court's judgment, based on
172. Id.
173. Id. at 736.
174. Id. at 738.
175. See supra Part I.
Would there not be the greatest reason to apprehend, that error in the first sen-
tence would be the parent of error in the second sentence? That the strong bias
of one decision would be apt to overrule the influence of any new lights, which
might be brought to vary the complexion of another decision?
Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 739 (quoting THE FEDERALIsT No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton)).
176. Id. The Court also noted that petitioner's argument would "place final reviewing
authority with respect to impeachments in the hands of the same body that the impeach-
ment process is meant to regulate." Id.
177. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
178. Id. at 549-50.
179. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 740. See also Victor Williams, Unconstitutional Bills of Attain-
der or Valid Impeachment Convictions?: The Walter Nixon and Alcee Hastings Impeach-
ment Cases, 22 Sw. U. L. REv. 1077, 1097-98 (1993). Williams argues that contrary to the
Chief Justice's assertion that no parallel provision exists to circumscribe the Senate im-
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his perception that the Framers' intent to assign impeachment to the
legislature was sufficient evidence of nonjusticiability. 180 Justice Ste-
vens found that the danger of deciding the impeachment by a com-
pletely arbitrary method was slight because the Senate recognized the
importance of its duty under the Constitution's impeachment trial
clause.18
1
Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, found the case to be
justiciable and therefore concurred only in the judgment. 182 Justice
White was extremely dissatisfied with the way the majority addressed
the separation of powers issue.'8 3 For Justice White, judicial review
was essential to ensure the fairness of the process184 Justice White
found that the word "sole" was intended merely to distinguish be-
tween the House and the Senate, each of which has a singular power
over the impeachment process. Justice White also found the term
"try" sufficiently definable and concluded that the judiciary has the
duty and province to determine the sufficiency of the Senate impeach-
ment procedure. 8 5
Although Justice Souter found the case nonjusticiable in his con-
curring opinion, 8 6 he left open the possibility of judicial review of
Senate impeachment procedures when justified by egregious circum-
stances. 8 7 Souter reasoned that trial by committee in the Senate was
not an occasion that demands an answer from the courts because the
committee trial is sufficient to satisfy the mandate of the impeachment
clause.1
88
peachment proceedings, the Bill of Attainder clause is such a provision. Id Williams ex-
plains that the Constitution's Bill of Attainder clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3) was
designed to prevent legislative punishment without judicial trial. Id. at 1100. Therefore,
Williams argues, the Senate use of a committee to take testimony in impeachment hearings
and the ultimate removal vote by the full Senate are the equivalent of legislative punish-
ment without judicial trial in violation of the restrictions of the Bill of Attainder Clause. Id
at 1101.
180. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 740 (Stevens, J., concurring).
181. Id. But see Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Federal Impeachment and Criminal Procedure:
The Framers' Intent, 52 MD. L. REv. 437, 456 (1993) (arguing that the Senate possibly
could use constitutionally suspicious methods for impeachment trials with no
repercussions).
182. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 742 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
183. Id.
184. Id. See also Napoleon B. Williams, Jr., The Historical and Constitutional Bases
for the Senate's Power to Use Masters or Committees to Receive Evidence in Impeachment
Trials, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 512, 513 (1975) (describing the separation of powers problems
inherent in the grant of the impeachment power).
185. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 747 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 748.
188. Id.
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The independence of the federal judiciary is a value that both
historic and modem social architects have endeavored to protect
through the impeachment clauses of the Constitution and the Judicial
Councils Act. The Nixon Court posed the questions of the validity of
the impeachment procedures as if the Justices had had no role in the
impeachment proceedings prior to the case being heard by the
Supreme Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist recited history and tradition
in the Nixon case to assert that the judiciary should not have any role
in impeachments because that could eviscerate what is effectively the
only check on the judiciary.189 Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on the
political question doctrine as a means of avoiding the more complex
issue of judicial involvement at all stages of an inherently political pro-
cess. 19° His failure to acknowledge the reality that judges are involved
in the impeachment process damages the public's perception of the
integrity of the judiciary.
The judiciary's ability to continue to shape public discourse lies
firmly in its ability to maintain public trust. The judiciary has been
described as the "least dangerous branch"' 91 because its power is de-
rived from public confidence in the judicial branch's integrity and in
the maintenance of the sanctity of the judicial process. It is disingenu-
ous to include judicial involvement in the initiation of impeachment
proceedings, while disallowing judicial involvement or review of sub-
sequent congressional proceedings, based on the theory that the judi-
ciary was not intended to participate in impeachments. This
inconsistency in the impeachment process, underscored by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion in Nixon, mandates that action be taken to
protect the sanctity of the judicial branch.
189. Id.
190. See also James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially
Unenforceable Rules That Combine with Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to Regulate
Political Behavior, 40 BuFF. L. Rnv. 645, 655-56 (1992) (noting the political question doc-
trine is expressed in ambiguous and conclusory terms).
191. THE FEDERALIsr No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); ALEXANDER BICKEL, Tan
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1986). As the Supreme Court has stated, "The legitimacy of
the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisan-
ship. That reputation may not be borrowed by the political branches to cloak their work in
the neutral colors of judicial action." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989).
The Federalist further supports this view with the notation that "[t]he Judiciary... has not
influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the
wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to
have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgement .... " THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at
465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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V. Incorporating Procedural Safeguards into the Judicial
Councils Act
Considering the manifest need to attack corruption at every level
of government, the interest in judicial policing is great. However, the
Judicial Councils Act sustains a procedure that fails to provide federal
judges with the protections of due process. Because judicial self-polic-
ing is necessary to the administration of a growing court system, at the
very least, procedural safeguards must be implemented to ensure due
process for accused judges. This Note argues for the adoption of for-
mal judicial review of the application of the Judicial Councils Act to
an accused judge, the public availability of investigatory actions, and a
formal procedure for addressing judicial conflicts of interest within the
judicial policing mechanism.
Formal judicial review of the proceedings of the investigating
committee and the judicial council as applied to a particular judge will
protect the sanctity of the process. To ensure that the fact finding
inherent in investigating committee actions is accurate and that judges
are afforded the due process protections guaranteed to them under
the Constitution, the safeguard of judicial review should be imple-
mented. Finally, judicial review of the proceedings at this early stage
in an impeachment inquiry is necessary precisely because the Supreme
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Rehnquist, has stated it will not
review the procedures of Congress.192
Public access to investigating committee actions will provide the
public with the confidence so necessary to ensure that justice is being
done. The inevitable tendency for the public to perceive that the judi-
ciary is either protecting its own, or conversely is unfairly condemning
a judge perceived to have brought the judiciary into disrepute, will be
lessened through the dissemination of this information. The public
will then understand the nature of the proceedings and will therefore
have greater confidence in the sanctity of the process.
The Congress finally should directly address the judicial conflicts
of interest problems that have plagued the impeachment cases. Be-
cause the Judicial Councils Act requires judges to investigate and dis-
cipline their colleagues, the provision of express procedures will likely
increase the consistency with which judicial misconduct is addressed.
This Note argues for the adoption of a random selection process for
the replacement of judges recused or otherwise disqualified from a
proceeding. Contrary to the perception that some judges may have
more expertise in some cases than in others and should therefore be
selected using that criterion, the federal judiciary is teeming with tal-
ented jurists, all of whom may adequately apply the precepts of law to
192. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735.
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the problems of a misconduct hearing. A random selection process
will exploit this pool, in addition to shielding the judiciary from the
public suspicion associated with the disjointed manner by which
judges are currently selected to serve in the face of recusal.
All of these reforms will protect the judiciary from the threat to
its character caused by the implementation of the current scheme of
judicial self-policing. Judges should be afforded this protection so that
the underlying goals of the Judicial Councils Act-maintaining the
public confidence in the judiciary and promoting the effective admin-
istration of justice-will be achieved. This will prevent an accused
judge-and the public-from operating within a sea of doubt and
suspicion.
Conclusion
The impeachment process was initially a constitutional process
designed to remove corrupt judges. With the implementation of the
Judicial Councils Act, it has since become largely a statutory process.
From the framing of the constitutional impeachment clauses to the
statutory attempt to streamline the impeachment process through the
Judicial Councils Act, it is clear that independence and accountability
are the two issues central to the maintenance of judicial indepen-
dence. In our haste for an expedient method of judicial discipline, we
have instead created a method by which judges are denied due pro-
cess, and the public is left to question whether justice is being done.
The modem impeachments of Judges Claiborne, Hastings, and
Nixon illustrate the limitations of the current system. Under the Judi-
cial Councils Act, accused judges are denied the essential check of
judicial review of the Act as applied to them. Further, as the Supreme
Court announced in the Nixon decision, the procedures of the Con-
gress in performing its role in impeachment is likewise immune from
judicial scrutiny, under the political question doctrine. It is precisely
because of this denial of judicial review of the end of the process that
resort to the courts should be allowed in the early stages of the pro-
cess. Additionally, the investigating committees created by the circuit
judicial councils under the Judicial Councils Act operate without in-
forming the public of their fact-finding process and investigatory ac-
tions. The public, susceptible to the perception that the judiciary is
either protecting its own or unfairly persecuting one who has allegedly
brought the judiciary into disrepute, is left to question whether, in
fact, justice is being done. An additional problem under the Act is
that it does not provide a mechanism for the consistent resolution of
judicial conflicts of interest. Because the judiciary is called upon not
only to investigate accused judges, but also to rule on the constitution-
ality of the Act itself, conflicts necessarily arise. Judges from the ac-
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cused judge's circuit, conscious of the need to preserve the sanctity of
the process, recuse themselves from impeachment related cases.
Nonetheless, the Act provides no method for their replacement.
This Note argues for judicial review of the Judicial Councils Act
as applied to accused judges, in addition to increasing public scrutiny
of investigatory committee actions and implementation of a random
selection process to improve the ad hoc method of replacement cur-
rently in place. All of these changes will create a process upon which
the judiciary-and the public-can depend.
